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Word Count: 14,308 
Filling the Void?: Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Philippine 
Independence, 1932-1937 
 Throughout the interwar period Great Britain and the United States faced the 
challenge of an expansionist Japan seeking to destabilize the established balance-of-power 
system that governed the international order in the Far East.1 The growth of the perception, 
and eventual reality, of the Japanese threat to both Western nations and their national security 
interests in the region, provoked a number of responses. International arms agreements, naval 
fortification agreements, declarations of spheres of influences in China, appeasement, 
coercion, persuasion, appeals to moderation, sanctions, embargoes, proxy war and economic 
warfare were all utilized at one time or another by Great Britain and America in the quest to 
arrest Japan’s drive to dominate Far Eastern international affairs in the period from 1931-
1942.2   
This study of Anglo-American strategic appreciations of the impact of potential 
Philippine independence on that Far Eastern international security system provides insights 
into a number of current international history debates concerning inter-war Anglo-American 
strategic relations. As well, the analysis provided offers insights into the various strategic 
concepts embedded in each Western nation and their use of diplomacy in relation to their 
deterrence, appeasement, coercion or compellence postures.3 Other lessons from this case 
study are relevant to the nature and character of the Anglo-American inter-war strategic 
relationship. The evidence presented adds credibility to the arguments which take the position 
that Anglo-American strategic relations generated by Far Eastern strategic considerations 
were the cornerstone of the pre-1941 alliance relationship. Furthermore, it reinforces the 
point that the wartime strategic alliance was not just the personal creation of a Churchill-
Roosevelt political interaction, but the logical outcome of years of informal, coordinated, 
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conscious, parallel strategic collaboration aimed at maintaining the balance of power in the 
Far East.4  
Other aspects of the study are important for achieving a greater clarity concerning the 
operationalisation (the process) of both British and American foreign policy formulation. 
Who within the various layers of the Foreign Office and State Department machinery, as well 
as other government departments in London and Washington, were engaged in the 
information gathering, intelligence creation, narrative construction and decision making 
required for the building of such a strategic relationship?5 Often a disparaging appreciation is 
made of such a holistic and deep-diving approach to understanding the actual decision-
making environment and mechanisms of foreign policy management, with such actions and 
influences referred to as merely being `What one clerk said to another`.6 That casual 
dismissal of more detailed and rigorous foreign policy and diplomatic analysis in favour of 
simplistic great man or grand strategy synthesis has all too often presented the eventual 
visible outcome or action as the actual strategy or policy.7 This is methodologically incorrect 
for the historical analysis of such foreign policy and diplomatic interactions, as well as 
misleading as to the reality and place of actors and agents with that decision making system 
and process. The following study represents a school of international history that argues the 
irrefutable centrality of understanding the meaning and importance of the how, where, why 
and who of “clerks” speaking to one another if historians are to understand the reality of the 
issues, the connections made over the deliberations of such incidents, and the true influences 
and values of the relationship that were complicit in the motivations of the decisions taken.8  
On the American side of the equation, the analysis provided here also challenges the 
existing literature which presents an adversarial and anti-British attitude being the norm for 
American policy makers charged with the conduct of Far Eastern foreign policy formulation, 
such as Stanley K. Hornbeck, Joseph Grew and Nelson T. Johnson. The archival evidence 
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provided reveals that even as early as 1934-35, such was simply not the case. Close strategic 
cooperation and understanding with Great Britain, regarding the situation in the Far East, 
served the national interests of the United States, a fact recognized and desired by all three 
men.9 Theirs was not a simple isolationist ideology which espoused that all American 
interests could be achieved by `going it alone’. 
Finally, as an incident in Anglo-American strategic relations, analysis of this 
particular event reinforces a growing international history literature, which is focused on the 
utility of using a case study/incident approach to not only illustrate larger strategic themes, 
but for emphasizing that multi-layered reality that was British and American inter-war 
foreign policy formulation. In focusing on particular incidences or international evolutions, 
and combining systemic analysis with an appreciation for personality and contingency, a 
more comprehensive and accurate appreciation for the complexity within such foreign policy 
formulation is achieved. 10 
American possession of the Philippine Islands was both a strategic boon and liability 
in the 1920s and 30s. While the use of basing facilities in the Philippines for the United States 
Navy (USN) allowed America to aspire to Mahanian ideals regarding the attributes of naval 
power, imperial possessions and accompanying power projection capabilities in the Far East, 
the reality of the strategic value of the former Spanish imperial outpost was a completely 
different matter.11 In the aftermath of the First World War, the Washington Naval Treaty 
system limited the strategic utility of the Islands for power projection and forward basing 
purposes.12 Unable to modernize or enlarge the fortifications already in place, combined with 
decreased USN ship strength, the strategic worth of the Philippines was in the eye of the 
beholder. Internationally-minded American policy makers viewed even the restricted worth 
of the Islands as a useful power projection and deterrence asset. US politicians and military 
leaders  not as enamoured of American imperial activities so far from the continental United 
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States saw them as a potentially dangerous strategic liability that could be easily held hostage 
or overwhelmed before the garrison could be reinforced or relieved.13 More importantly, the 
Islands were situated in the midst of the most dynamic and fractious part of the inter-war 
international system, compelling the United States to have to participate in the ongoing 
balance of power process generated by the national security competition existing between 
Japan, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.14 The ultimate prize for the United States and the 
other Powers was to either expand, protect or consolidation their various strategic interests in 
China.15 However, the requirement to provide security for the Philippines added another 
dimension to the American position within that balance of power dynamic.  
By the mid-1930s, with the rise of continued Japanese competition in the Far East 
seeking to limit or diminish America’s presence in the region, domestic American opinion 
questioned the utility of further protection and possession of the Islands.16 However, the 
consideration of granting independence for the Philippines became a strategic risk in its own 
right due to the significant disruption such action would create in the balance of power 
relationship which provided stability in the Far East.17 One of the disruptions to that Far 
Eastern balance, created through the contemplation of Philippine independence, was the 
question: if the United States would not provide security and stability for the Islands, then 
who would? Providing an answer to that question was one of the many strategic crossroads 
for Great Britain and the United States in the region. Common strategic values such as 
democracy, the rule of law and capitalism, shared strategic interests in the containment of 
Japan, the creation of stability in China and the provision of a balanced international system  
in the region, were all part of the dialogue surrounding the strengthening of the Anglo-
American strategic relationship surrounding the Philippine question. However, it was not 
international relations or questions of strategic positioning that began the Anglo-American 
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interaction over importance of the Philippines but rather domestic American trade 
questions.18 
In January 1933, despite a veto by President Herbert Hoover to the contrary, Congress 
passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. The legislation provided for the independence of the 
Philippine Islands, although not immediately. Aware of the enormous impact the granting of 
immediate independence would have on the Island’s economy, governance and financial 
stability, a transitional period of ten years was established in order to make the move to being 
a separate and self-governing nation less disruptive.19 The main driving force behind the 
Hoover government granting  independence was that administration’s failure to secure a tariff 
on Philippine products or any limitation on imports of Philippine sugar. That failure created a 
large movement in favour of Philippine independence amongst mainland US states affected 
by  the market competition. In particular, Philippine cane sugar and coconut oil were in direct 
competition with American beet sugar and dairy products. Aligned with the agrarian states 
were the Pacific coast states that resented the seemingly unlimited number of cheap Filipino 
labourers immigrating to the mainland.20 Therefore, from such domestic commercial tensions 
did a potential shift in the Far Eastern strategic balance of power arise. 
That winter the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Ronald C. Lindsay, 
informed London that the Philippine President, Manuel L. Quezon, was being largely ignored 
by American politicians and the press as he paid another trip to Washington in order to 
attempt to get the American Government to change the conditions of the independence 
legislation. Mired in domestic trade and commerce issues, reported Lindsay, Quezon’s 
appearance had generated some signs of higher strategic thinking and analysis in Washington 
about what independence would mean.21 Influential newspaper publisher William R. Hearst 
warned of the potential for Japanese commercial and economic penetration of the Philippines, 
which would provide the rationale for any future military action Japan thought necessary to 
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protect its interests. Throwing away the strategic utility of the Philippines as a base of 
operations for protecting American interests in the Far East, as well as the indigenous 
commercial value of the Islands to the American economy overall, was a selfish, short-
sighted and disloyal act that played straight into the hands of the Japanese.22 Isolationist 
Senator William Borah represented the opposite view to Hearst. He told the Associated Press 
that he would like to see the United States dispose of all her overseas possessions with the 
exception being the immediately adjacent Islands required for coastal defence. Tired of the 
Philippine requests for independence  and seeing them as being unwilling to take 
responsibility for what that meant, Borah hoped that America would relieve itself of the 
strategic liability as soon as possible.23 Lindsay’s observations initiated the Foreign Office’s 
(FO) contemplation of what the Far East would be like without an American-protected 
Philippines. Sir Robert Craigie, Head of the FO’s American Department and the man at the 
forefront of British naval disarmament negotiations gave some of the first thoughts on that 
potential new reality.24 Craigie, concerned about the viability of the Washington Naval Treaty 
system past the scheduled 1935 London Naval Conference, pointed out that if that system 
collapsed and all Powers were free to build fortified naval bases in the Far East, the US 
would have to reconsider the degree of political freedom granted to the Islands.25  
The question of the utility of America possessing naval bases was an important theme 
in early 1934. Delays in the final agreement regarding the independence act allowed the press 
and politicians, as well as diplomatic and military observers, time to reflect on what not being 
able to maintain a forward naval presence in the Far East would mean to American influence 
and prestige. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in an address to Congress on the nature of the 
amended agreement with the Islands made vague and indecisive comments on the basing 
matter, declaring that the Act would allow the United States the right to retain military and 
naval bases in the Islands if it so wished, even after actual independence had been granted. 
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He recommended, however, that the military bases be given over to the independent 
Philippine Government upon the implementation of actual independence, while the naval 
bases not suffer the same fate. The President recommended that the law be changed so that 
the satisfactory resolution of the control of naval bases question could be resolved `… on 
terms satisfactory to our own Government and that of the Philippine Islands.`26 
The basing amendments, along with a few commercial details, were incorporated into 
the Tydings-McDuffie Bill, which President Roosevelt signed on March 24th, 1934. The Bill 
ensured American access to the Philippine bases for the next ten years while the 
independence transition went on.27 British FO officials hoped that the United States would 
continue to project naval power forward into the Far East, using the Philippines in that power 
projection system to act as a deterrent to Japan’s desire for expansion. As importantly, 
retention of an American naval presence was a demonstration of American resolve to stay 
engaged in the regional balance of power system. An American presence ensured that Britain 
could not be easily singled out by Japan for greater concessions in the region, particularly 
regarding China.28 Such public and political displays in the continental United States were 
only part of the picture with regard to the shaping of Anglo-American strategic relations on 
the matter. 
 In the spring of 1933 the American Ambassador to China, Nelson T. Johnson, drew 
the State Department’s attention to the importance of the Philippine independence issue to 
American security in the Far East. He pointed out the fact that Japan’s attitude was one of 
disregard for international treaties and that an unprotected Philippines would in all likelihood 
be considered a target of opportunity for Japanese expansionism.29 Furthermore, the 
American departure from the Philippines, and ensuing instability, was not just an American 
conundrum but a problem for the British, French and Dutch colonial positions in the Far East 
as well. That point had been made clear to Ambassador Johnson during one of his frequent 
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and extensive conversations with senior British naval officers stationed in the Far East. Over 
the course of three days of chatting, golfing and dining, Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer, the 
recently appointed Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the British China Squadron, along with 
his Chief of Staff, Commodore Thomson, drove home the Admiralty view on America 
abandoning her Far Eastern outpost emphatically to Johnson. The Royal Navy officers told 
Johnson that Britain wished to see a strong American naval presence in the Far Eastern 
waters. Abandoning the Philippine naval position would instead send a strong message to 
Japan that American naval power was not a viable deterrent in the region.30  
While the information had not been solicited by the American Ambassador, and 
offered as the Royal Navy Officer’s own personal views, Johnson felt that the discussions 
were indicative of the reporting being sent to London on the matter, and also represented the 
tenor of a strong strand of British naval and foreign policy. He invited the Stated Department 
to pay particular attention to a theme Admiral Dreyer had hinted at, in a purposeful but non-
committal fashion; that Great Britain considered the possession of the Philippines and control 
of the vital naval base at Manila Bay by a friendly power to be so critical for its own Far East 
strategic situation that in the event of America abandoning the Islands completely Great 
Britain would have to fill that vacuum and take over the protection of the Philippines in order 
to prevent Manila Bay from coming under Japanese control.31 As for being able to entangle 
the Japanese into any effective security arrangement for the Islands once the United States 
had withdrawn, Johnson was most sceptical. He held little faith in the Japanese abiding by 
any agreement regarding a neutralized Philippines in the aftermath of that nation ignoring its 
previous commitments to such international agreements as the Washington Treaty and 
Kellogg Pact. Furthermore, Great Britain could not be condemned for thinking similarly 
about Japan in such circumstances. If Britain did feel abandoned by America, Johnson 
argued, its choices would be between either appeasing Japan and making the best of that 
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relationship, or leading a French/Dutch coalition, minus a reliable US, to challenge Japan’s 
expansion. Such an alliance was problematic to create, to say nothing of presenting itself as 
an effective military conglomeration that could deter Japan.By the spring of 1934, a number 
of converging strategic concerns about America’s future as a maritime power in the Far East 
supported Johnson’s assessment.33 
 Both Great Britain and the United States were concerned about the ability of the 
upcoming London Naval Conference in 1935 to provide the restrictions on Japanese naval 
power that it had in the past. As well, both nations believed that the chances of Japan leaving 
the treaty system, due to its inferior allowable tonnage in comparison to the two western 
Powers, were high.34 Unfettered by any naval building restriction, Japan would be free to 
create an even larger navy to assist its destabilizing, expansionist policies in the region. Such 
a condition created grave concerns for American and British strategic foreign policy makers 
in and of itself. Linking the possibility of a transitioning and unprotected Philippine 
independence element into the equation gave even greater cause for serious considerations of 
possible future sources of tension in the Far Eastern balance of power.35 
 In May 1934, reports from intelligence sources in the Philippines made their way to 
the British embassy in Japan that President Quezon was experiencing some doubts as to the 
security of the Islands as an independent entity. The respected Far Eastern expert and 
commercial counsellor at the embassy, George Sansom, informed the FO that Quezon was 
concerned about an independent Philippines being able to resist Japanese commercial and 
economic advances.36 Conversations with retired British Lieutenant-Colonel Hodsoll, a 
resident of Manila and close friend of the Philippine President, just prior to Quezon’s mission 
to Washington in late 1933, saw Quezon reveal intimate insights into his lack of faith in the 
Islands ability to go it alone. As a result, Hodsell, under oath to not repeat the conversation 
within the Islands, was told that Quezon was willing to `go hat in hand to Downing Street` to 
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ask for the Philippines to be admitted into the British Commonwealth in order to acquire a 
more secure position.37 This revelation did not generate an immediate or high-level response 
from the British foreign policy making machinery within the FO, but the possibility of Britain 
being placed in an awkward position with the United States by the Philippine situation was 
now a question that needed to be interrogated.  
 The impact of the Philippine question on American security in region was also being 
similarly interrogated in Washington. In January 1934, Stanley K. Hornbeck, the head of the 
State Department’s Far Eastern Department, told Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr 
that it was his belief that the realisation of a `desirable solution’ to the Philippine issue was 
not politically achievable. Hornbeck hoped that the whole problem would be shelved and an 
official decision deferred until conditions in the Far East made such a destabilizing event less 
likely to create major ripples in the existing balance of power. A proponent of naval building 
and increasing America’s ability to use credible naval power to deter Japan, Hornbeck wished 
to see a stronger USN in place in the Pacific before the Philippine question was resolved.38 
Then, from a position of strength sound strategic decisions could be made: `However, if my 
advice were sought by the Administration in connection with this question, my suggestion 
would be that effort be made to get the question into executive hands and out of legislative 
hands.`39 
By autumn of that year Hornbeck’s desires were being fulfilled. On September 26th, 1934, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull convened a meeting between senior State Department and 
United States Navy officers to discuss the impact of the Philippine question on American 
strategic relations in the Far East and the upcoming naval conference talks in London. 
Assistant Undersecretary of State William Phillips, Hornbeck, Chief of the Western European 
Division of the State Department, James C. Dunn, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
William H. Standley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, H.L. Roosevelt, and Vice Admiral J. 
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Greenslade, Commander Battleships United States Fleet met with Hull and quickly got to the 
topic of the effect of a US withdrawal from the Philippines on American naval strength.40 
Admiral Standley stated his view that the withdrawal had greater diplomatic ramifications 
than strategically. He acknowledged that the American declaration was causing other Powers 
in the region to reconsider their own policies regarding strategic alignments. Overall, 
however, he argued the independence issue was not the dominant feature of American naval 
force in the Far East. That strength would be commensurate with the desire the nation had to 
support vital policies such as the Open Door Policy, Nine Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, 
and others which rested upon substantial American naval power being present in the Far East. 
If, however, the policy was to withdraw from those obligations and the region, it was best to 
begin that process now in the Philippine situation.41 The consensus of the meeting was that a 
policy of scuttle from the region was not acceptable for American strategic interests. 
Therefore, support for those international obligations and the associated naval strength, 
including critical basing rights, were seen as being absolutely necessary. Consensus was also 
achieved with regard to the perspective that to withdraw from either support to those policies 
or to withdraw American naval power from the Far East would only encourage Japan to 
further aggression in the region.42 As for their collective view of Japan’s place in the Far 
Eastern balance of power system, `It was further the consensus that Japan’s policy was 
definitely to continue its aims at dominating Eastern Asia. In these plans she is being held up 
at present by the United States and similarly by Great Britain. It was not felt, however, that 
she would give up her long term ambitions and would seek every occasion to press them 
further.`43 If the Philippines were left exposed and unprotected in the more volatile 
environment that the post-London Naval Conference Far East potentially could be, Japan 
would in all likelihood engulf the Islands into the Japanese Empire. 
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 British preparations for the London Conference also included considering America’s 
strategic intention in the Far East in general and its remaining in the Philippines 
specifically.44 In September 1934, the Marquess of Lothian, Philip Kerr, a firm believer of 
and tireless supporter for closer Anglo-American strategic relations (and future British 
Ambassador to the United States), visited  America.45 Well networked into that nation’s 
foreign policy making elite, Kerr was granted an interview with President Roosevelt in order 
to get an `unofficial` insight into the American President’s policies with regard to the London 
Conference, security in the Far East, European security and international monetary policy.46 
The President, annoyed with the British over textile trade agreements that allowed Japan 
access to the Indian market, thus disadvantaging America’s textile trade with the Philippines 
due to Japan being able to dump cheap goods into that market because of the profits found in 
India,47 told Lothian that the idea of a formal anti-Japanese alliance was not achievable, for 
both domestic and international reasons. The American people would not stand for such an 
entanglement of American interests with a European, imperial state, and Japan’s reaction to 
such an overt statement could be more dangerous than the various outcomes that were yet to 
be explored through coercive, deterrence and engagement policies. Cooperation between the 
two English-speaking nations would `…have to rest on the fundamental identity of their 
interests and ideals.`48 Roosevelt spent a large part of the conversation exposing Lothian to 
his view of the strategic situation in the Far East. America, FDR explained, was under no 
illusion as to the imperial and expansionist nature of Japan, and that the immediate aim of its 
foreign and defence policies was to either acquire parity at the London conference, thereby 
assuring local naval superiority, or, to acquire a greater sphere of influence from which to 
build a series of naval and air bases to establish a more capable deterrent through defence in 
depth. The best way to deal with such a situation, opined the President, was for Great Britain 
and the United States to ensure they took a firm line with Japan along the same strategic 
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issues, thus creating the image of solidarity and unity within the Japanese strategic thinking 
process.49 As for the place of the Philippines within all of this, when asked directly by 
Lothian whether the United States would abandon the Islands and associated naval bases, 
Roosevelt’s position was, `He said not for ten years but at the end of ten years it was possible 
and even probable.`50  
 Shortly after Philip Kerr’s interview with President Roosevelt, the British naval 
attaché in Washington, Captain A. R. Dewar, informed the head of the RN’s Intelligence 
Division, Admiral G.C. Dickens, of senior American naval and marine officer attitudes 
toward the Philippine question. Directed by Dickens to investigate specifically this particular 
issue, Dewar had a wide-ranging network to utilize. His investigations revealed that the USN 
was indeed wrestling with confirming the exact impact the independence issue raised. Many 
senior individuals, such as a Chief of Bureau and General Wells, Commander of the Marine 
garrison in Hawaii and a man with intimate knowledge of the Philippines, had openly 
declared their desire for the United States to leave the Islands as soon as possible. Such 
opinion arose from a combination of scepticism regarding America’s level of strategic 
interest in the region, and a belief  that holding the Islands in the face of full Japanese 
aggression was not a viable option. Both were reluctant to see the United States put into a 
position of being involved in any international troubles arising in the Far East.51 Further, 
Dewar was of the opinion that, `I am rather inclined to think that this opinion may be held 
oftener than it is expressed.`52 The implications of such statements were clearly an important 
issue for the British to have to recognize. Reports of American senior officers having grave 
doubts as to America’s future in the Far East only added to the scepticism of the First Sea 
Lord, Admiral Sir A. Ernle M. Chatfield regarding the reliability of the United States as a 
possible ally in the region. Nonetheless, despite his reservations, Chatfield was forced to have 
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to agree to the FO line that America’s potential for support was a prize worth more than 
Japanese promises to recognize British interests in the Far East.53 
 In February 1935, Admiral Dickens asked the FO for their assessment of general 
conditions in the Far East concerning Great Britain’s strategic interests, with an emphasis on 
the likelihood of Japan being able to seize the resource-rich Dutch Netherlands East Indies. A 
comprehensive reply was prepared, with an important part of that appreciation focused on the 
Philippine situation.54 The FO pointed firstly to the American Government’s tendency to 
focus on domestic matter rather than international questions, which was a position tinged 
with a large portion of the population espousing pacifist sentiments with regard to the foreign 
affairs. More and more the United States was seen to be disengaging from the most 
contentious region, the Far East, in order to avoid any potential conflict with Japan. Yet, an 
equally large part of the nation regarded a war with Japan as inevitable and desired a strong 
navy and naval presence in the Pacific. The FO regarded the root of the Philippine 
independence action being the result of that American international aloofness and ordinary 
commercial selfishness.55 As for the strategic importance of the Philippines to the British 
strategic position: 
The independence of the Philippines is a factor which in its turn may have 
incalculable consequences for the future balance of power in the South Seas…. We 
should not forget, in this connexion, that if America eventually gives up her last 
strongholds in the Philippines, the naval bases, (as she may when the matter comes up 
for discussion in something approaching twenty years) an independent Philippines 
Government will be far weaker and more defenceless in the face of Japan even than 
that of the Netherlands East Indies. …. It would appear to follow that if Japanese 
designs on the Philippines develop, His Majesty’s Governments may one day be 
confronted with just as grave a problem in these regions as that we have set ourselves 
to examine in connexion with the Netherlands East Indies.56 
The FO’s strategic assessment was deemed worthy of consideration by not only the RN’s 
senior leadership, but also the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee (COS) and Cabinet, all of whom subsequently analysed it. With requests for 
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higher consideration of the question being supported by the FO’s Permanent Undersecretary 
Sir Robert Vansittart and the Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, as well as the Secretary of 
the CID Sir Maurice Hankey, the issue of the importance of the Philippines to British security 
in the Far East was clearly becoming more pronounced within the British strategic policy 
making elite. 
 In the State Department, consideration of the Philippine issue was also building 
strategic momentum. At the start of 1935, Stanley K. Hornbeck advised Secretary of State 
Hull about the general strategic picture in the Far East. The Island’s status was a source of 
possible tension for US-Japanese relations, but one among many.57 The idea of independence 
was not to be taken as a reality just yet, said Hornbeck. He warned that there were many 
things that could derail the Islands moving from under America’s protection, and to make 
plans for the future based around no American presence or strategic interest in the Philippines 
was not a sound approach. Associated with the issue’s effect on Far Eastern strategic 
relations Hornbeck appealed for continuity in American foreign policy in the Pacific  due to 
that region being the most important for the nation’s security policies.58 Quoting Theodore 
Roosevelt’s maximum to speak softly and carry a big stick, the Head of the Far East Division 
called on the administration to prepare the navy and its supporting structures, such as bases, 
for a possible conflict with Japan: `To be, in relations with Japan, secure, and to have, in 
relation to our legitimate interests in the Far East, influence, we must possess both the fact 
and the appearance of political and economic and military strength, especially the strength of 
a powerful and adequately equipped Navy.`59 Japan would continue to challenge America’s 
desire to uphold the laws and structures that produced the existing balance of power in the 
region, he believed. Furthermore, it was not in the interests of the United States to itself 
injection destabilizing, new issues into the international order of the region, such as the 
question of who would oversee and protect the Philippine Islands.60 Finally, Hornbeck called 
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upon America to work closely with Great Britain in providing stability and governance in the 
region, believing that their common values and desire for upholding international law and 
order made them natural allies against Japanese de-stabilizing efforts: 
We should cultivate in relation to problems of the Far East conditions of close 
harmony and the maximum of practical cooperation between ourselves and Great 
Britain. Toward doing this, we should go out of our way to inform the British 
Government of our views, to consult them with regard to theirs, to give them notice of 
our intentions, et cetera, et cetera, in regard to matters where there is involved a 
community, a parity or a similarity of interest. We should, in dealing with them 
coordinate our moves and methods with regard to Far Eastern matters with our moves 
and methods in regard to other matters.61 
Hornbeck’s appreciation and suggested way forward was in unison with 
recommendations put forward by the United States Ambassador in Japan, Joseph P. Grew, 
who also called for closer Anglo-American cooperation in thwarting Japanese aggression and 
expansion.62 These evaluations and recommendations regarding the Far East, Philippines and 
Great Britain, were all put to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt for their 
consideration.63 The eventual appointment of General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of 
the United States Army in September 1935, signalled a level of investment and interest by the 
United States in the continued wellbeing of the Islands and their staying within the American 
security orbit.64 The Hornbeck/Grew case for sustained American interest in the fate of the 
Philippines appeared to hold a good deal of influence within the Roosevelt administration. 
 The British evaluation of the situation in 1935 confirmed a sustained American 
interest in retaining bases and influence in the Far East through a military presence in the 
Islands.65 Reports from Washington and the Philippines confirmed that the United States was 
going to lease air and naval bases in the Islands. MacArthur was to train the local forces to 
defend the islands, all of which was interpreted as indicating that the United States would 
continue to be responsible for the security of the Islands.66 That strategic condition was a 
great relief to the British. Such a commitment was not only important for the Philippines but 
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was also taken as a general sign of America’s commitment to remaining a serious contributor 
to the regional balance of power.67 Colonel Hodsoll, now a key source for the FO, WO and 
Admiralty regarding insights into the situation in the Philippines, made three main points on 
the matter to the British policy making elite.68 Firstly, there was a slowing down, in both the 
USA and Philippines of the idea of complete independence. Secondly, the Americans were 
fully expected to retain naval bases in the Islands. Finally, as a consequence of clearer and 
closer Anglo-American strategic understanding, there was a general expectation in the 
Philippines that the US and Great Britain would cooperate to check any future Japanese 
penetration.69 This newly re-invigorated appreciation of America’s potential support for 
Great Britain’s interests in the Far East guided the British response to a request by Quezon in 
the autumn of 1935 for the appointment of a British economic advisor to his government.70  
While certain elements of the FO thought the prestige of such an appointment would 
be a good thing for the protection of British trade interests with the Islands, greater strategic 
considerations such as those voiced by Robert Craigie, called for caution. Comparing the 
situation to be the equivalent of America offering to provide an economic advisor to the 
Egyptian government, Craigie counselled restraint and the avoidance of irritating a now 
friendly US administration over such a minor matter. Before any action was taken, the FO 
asked Ambassador Lindsay to investigate the American attitude towards the issue.71 On the 
heels of an earlier indication by President Quezon that he desired closer strategic relations 
with Great Britain, the FO was wary of any actions that appeared to create closer strategic 
links with the Philippines.72 Such an act would either encourage the United States to 
withdraw more quickly from the region or irritate the Japanese as they would be branded the 
aggressive, destabilizing reason for Britain assuming the protection of the island. Under such 
conditions, Great Britain could expect Japan to thereafter be more belligerent towards British 
Far Eastern interests overall. As well, taking up the appointment could re-kindle anti-British 
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sentiments within the American administration of British imperial and commercial 
competition making inroads in the region at America’s expense. While Lindsay was 
consulting with the State Department about its views of closer Great Britain/Philippine 
relations, efforts to ascertain the degree of sincerity President Quezon possessed for closer 
relations with Britain were also underway. 
 As 1935 drew to an end reports from Manila continued to highlight the growing 
possibility of President Quezon approaching Great Britain for entry into the Commonwealth.  
A.L. Kennedy of The Times and A.P. Blunt, Consul-General in Manila, conducted a range of 
extensive discussions with the Filipino leader on December 12.  They focused their 
discussions on the idea which Roy Howard, an influential American newspaper publisher, 
had put forward in his papers proclaiming that the Philippines, if abandoned by America, 
would petition for incorporation into the British Empire.73 Quezon emphasized the 
uncertainty within the United States Government as to which option was preferred: remain 
militarily and economically in the Islands, or, to remove all liability of American 
responsibility for the security of the Islands. When pressed by Kennedy and Blunt about the 
circumstances under which he envisioned the Islands entering the British Empire, Quezon 
replied that it all depended on whether the United States wished to remain in the Far East to 
protect their own vital interests in the face of increasing imperialistic behaviour on the part of 
Japan. If the United States did not feel it had a strategic need to remain in the region then 
there was nothing more to talk about. If America did feel that the Far East was strategically 
important to their future then the Islands were a valuable defence attribute that could not be 
ignored. Blunt informed the FO that with regard to British interests in the US/Philippines 
question: `The remarks …struck both Mr. Kennedy and myself as particularly instructive. 
They explain how, and on what grounds, an appeal to His Majesty’s Government might 
arise.`74Answering the question regarding how far President Quezon would take his 
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exploration regarding possible entry into the British imperial system was an important part of 
the Anglo-American strategic relationship throughout 1936. 
 With the Washington Treaty System apparently unravelling after the failure of the 
1935 London Naval Conference to retain Japanese support, some American Far Eastern 
experts  were concerned about Great Britain’s future international relations and actions in 
Asia. On July 2, 1936, the day he was due to return to America for a period of leave, the 
American Counselor of Embassy in London, Ray Atherton, invited the former British 
Ambassador to China, Sir Alexander Cadogan, to lunch.75 The purpose of the luncheon was 
for Atherton to solicit Cadogan’s perspective on Great Britain’s Far Eastern strategy before 
he took on his new official duties in the FO and became restricted in what he would be able 
to say on and off the record. Cadogan was non-committal as to how Britain would safeguard 
its national interests in the Far East within the changed environment created by the results of 
the failed London Naval Conference. While not proposing that he supported the idea of a 
renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Cadogan was also clear in explaining the need Great 
Britain had for continued amicable relations with Japan. Cadogan told Atherton that, `…he 
felt that outside nations must maintain and uphold their rights insofar as possible, conscious, 
however, that his country certainly felt, and he was inclined to believe that that sentiment was 
the same in the United States, that neither nation would fight in the Far East.`76 Without any 
guarantee of assured American support for a more confrontational or punitive approach to 
deterring Japanese expansion, Cadogan was unwilling to rule out any viable strategic option 
that could deliver Great Britain’s security needs. Of particular note, reported Atherton,  
I said to him …. both countries should realize that in the same way that nature 
abhorred a vacuum the Japanese would abhor an Anglo-American front against them 
and they would avoid any action, I thought, that would tend to unite us. I was 
particularly struck by the fact that Cadogan in no way attempted to inspire me with an 
idea that he or his Government favoured a day-to-day Anglo-American front, which 
would merely possibly make the Japanese harder to work with.77 
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Atherton was not alone with his concerns over Great Britain’s true intentions in the Far East 
Fuelled by the ill-timed and ill-conceived Far Eastern tour of senior British Treasury 
official, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, American Ambassadors Grew and Johnson tended towards 
emphasizing the need for America to be cautious of Great Britain appeasing Japan to such an 
extent that it endangered the ability of the two Western nations to be able to cooperate in any 
meaningful way in the deterrence of Japan.78 Hornbeck differed from the two Ambassadors in 
that, while he acknowledged Great Britain’s need to appease certain aspects of Japan’s desire 
for greater influence in the Far East, he also believed that the strategic similarity and ties to 
the United States would see the two nations able to collaborate constructively and 
consistently in creating a deterrent effect. In particular, confronted by the Japanese 
withdrawal from the London Naval Conference, Great Britain and the United States were 
investing in greater levels of naval power and associated basing infrastructure to support their 
positions in the region. Part of that basing was to be provided by the Philippines. MacArthur 
and Quezon were working vigorously, Hornbeck pointed out, to strengthen the defences of 
the Islands in order to secure those facilities for American naval forces to use.79 These 
operational conditions were a central part of creating a stronger American naval capability in 
the region, as well as sending a strategic signal to Great Britain that US investment in the 
Islands, and Far East in general, was a strategic reality. For Hornbeck, such actions meant 
that: `Thus, it may reasonably be said there has been created and there is being hardened a 
military `iron ring’ around Japan.’80 But that ring would only be effective as a limiting 
influence on Japan if it remained intact. 
Still, the experience of the two nations working together during the London Naval 
Conference and over international trade issues had created a situation that held great promise 
for the iron ring indeed holding.  American Ambassador to Great Britain, Robert W. 
Bingham, had always held the creation of closer and more effective Anglo-American 
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strategic relations as one of his key objectives. In light of such discussions as those taking 
place around the Philippine issue the Ambassador believed that his strategic desire was 
indeed becoming a reality. This strengthened relationship was an important development 
Bingham believed, due to the dangers facing both nations in the years immediately ahead, 
where the need for the intimate strategic understanding would be crucial. Bingham informed 
the British that this was also the view of newly re-elected President Roosevelt and Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull, as well as large swathes of more influential American business and 
financial leaders: `Both countries knew that any idea of an actual military alliance was out of 
the question – at all events in advance of an emergency – but, short of this, there was ample 
scope for the closest consultation and co-operation.`81 Did President Quezon’s quest for 
entrance into the British Empire endanger that growing Anglo-American strategic 
relationship and the strength of the iron ring or not was the strategic question to be answered? 
As 1936 neared an end the issue moved from the realm of the hypothetical to a reality. 
 On December 11, Colonel Hodsoll, acting on behalf of President Quezon, attended a 
meeting in London at the Foreign Office with one of the senior members of the American 
Department, J.M. Troutbeck. The topic discussed was the likelihood of FO officials receiving 
President Quezon to discuss the future status of the Islands when the President attended the 
upcoming Coronation ceremony in May 1937.82 Senior officials cautioned against taking on 
any further Far Eastern commitments. To do so would generate both an aggressive Japanese 
response, aimed at all British interests in the region, as well as aggravate Anglo-American 
strategic relations.83 Robert Craigie, fresh from his role as chief negotiator at the London 
Naval Conference, and soon to be Ambassador to Japan, posited that it would perhaps be a 
good idea to sound out the Americans, without giving President Quezon away, as to what 
they thought of the idea of the Philippines being part of the Empire. Simultaneously, he 
cautioned against taking on additional strategic liabilities in the region.84 The twin Permanent 
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Under-Secretaries, Sir Alexander Cadogan and Sir Robert Vansittart, agreed generally with 
Craigie’s approach. Cadogan was sceptical regarding the competence of American foreign 
policy in the Pacific, advising that, `It is they [America] who have created this difficulty for 
him [Quezon]: the Tydings-McDuffie Act seems to recognise that the US will continue to 
have some responsibility for the fate of the islands: has he asked them whether they have as 
yet any idea as to how they propose to discharge their responsibility?`85 Vansittart was in 
favour of engaging with Quezon and ensuring that British neglect of the situation did not 
push the President towards closer ties with Japan. He recommended that the CID be advised 
of the level of importance the issue had now achieved, and while that was being done the 
Americans could be approached and their view obtained.86 However, the new Foreign 
Secretary, Anthony Eden, while he agreed with Cadogan that Quezon should attempt to get a 
firm answer from the Americans as to their intentions, was not as passive as the rest of the 
FO members. He did not view the question as an issue that Great Britain had to deal with 
alone. Indeed, he believed that the long-term security of the Islands was a matter that Great 
Britain and the United States could collaborate on jointly, enhancing their strategic 
relationship to contain Japan.87 Faced with some hard choices ahead, Craigie proposed that 
the FO inform Quezon that they would indeed be happy to meet with him during the 
Coronation, but the Philippine President would be well advised to acquire an American 
statement as to their intentions towards the Islands before he arrived. Furthermore, because 
`… the most important thing in all this is to avoid any misunderstanding over this with the 
United States.`, Craigie would meet with Ray Atherton for an intimate discussion to try and 
gain greater clarity of the American position on the matter.88 As 1936 came to a close Eden 
approved Craigie’s approach and authorized him to meet with Atherton.89 
 On February 19, 1937, Craigie met with Atherton to discuss the Quezon matter. 
Craigie asked him to find out the State Department's position on US intentions towards 
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protecting the Islands. Atherton was informed that the FO would meet with Quezon and let 
the President put forward his points, but would be unwilling to commit Great Britain in 
anyway.  As well, Craigie, `… would not, however, deny that this question of the probable 
United States attitude towards the defence of the Philippines was a matter of very close 
concern to His Majesty's Government and that it would help us very much to have some 
indication of the probable intentions of the United States Government in this matter.  We had 
not, of course, the slightest intention to interfere in any way, but it was obvious that, if the 
United States should wash her hands completely of any responsibility for the Philippines, this 
would raise a problem of first-class importance for ourselves.`90 The FO had shown 
themselves willing and able to cooperate and share sensitive materials with the United States 
regarding Far Eastern security, a condition desired by many within the policy making elites 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Atherton expressed his gratitude for the request, being grateful 
the question was asked, as he had felt personally for some time that it was imperative that the 
US Government took the matter more seriously.91 He assured Craigie that he would contact 
Secretary Hull immediately to get clarification on this important matter and cooperate on a 
mutually agreeable resolution to the problem. 
 True to his word Atherton informed Hull and the State Department of the FO’s 
approach to him and their desire for clarity of the American attitude towards retaining naval 
bases and security obligations in the Philippines.92 He relayed to Hull Quezon’s desire to 
know if Britain would provide security for the Islands, given that American officials had been 
unwilling to confirm whether or not there would be a continued presence and interest, not 
only in the Islands, but in the Far East in general. Furthermore, Quezon was willing to 
consider turning to the Japanese for future economic and military security if the United States 
or Great Britain were willing to provide reassurance to the Philippines. Such matters were 
important to the British Government’s planning for the protection of their Far Eastern 
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interests, Atherton explained, and therefore they desired Hull’s views on the matter.93 Vital to 
that future of Far Eastern stability was the growing British desire for joint and collaborative 
actions with the United States to create order in the region, and for that reason Atherton 
reported, `The Foreign Office concluded by saying that they were most anxious there should 
be no misunderstanding between the two Governments on this general problem since their 
interests were `identical’.`94  
 By May 1937, the Roosevelt Administration was taking greater control of the 
situation. Citing the ability of the newly re-elected Roosevelt Government to now focus on 
the question, Hull could reassure the British on many elements connected to the issue. He 
wanted the British to understand that Quezon could not be considered the head of an 
independent state but instead an official under the American Government, and that he (Hull) 
too shared a desire that the Anglo-American axis be firmly of the same mind on the matter. 
Hull instructed Atherton to inform the FO that Quezon was in the US to discuss the 
Philippine independence matter with the Government. It was Hull’s belief that the 
discussions would result in a mutually beneficial program regarding the provision of security 
for the Islands. Hull intimated that the State Department would in all likelihood discuss that 
arrangement with the British in the near future to ensure that HM Government were aware of 
all necessary developments.95 
 
Hull’s views were also reflective, he advised the British, of the President’s desire for a 
sustained presence in the Far East and closer Anglo-American strategic relations,96 as well as 
other key members of the American Far Eastern policy making elite. Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), Admiral William C. Leahy, and Commander-in-Chief of the United 
States Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, were also of the opinion that American Far 
Eastern security required a sustained presence in the Philippines, as well as closer strategic 
relations with Great Britain in deterring Japan.97 With such collusion and collaboration in 
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place the State Department had no problem in assuring President Quezon that an American 
presence in the Islands and Far East was a reality for the future, closely linked to Great 
Britain’s power in the region. As well, Quezon was deterred from visiting Britain for the 
Coronation and did not get the opportunity to become a formal and visible source of irritation 
and embarrassment to the British Government. Anglo-American diplomatic joint efforts had 
defused the situation while at the same time had added to the growing closeness and 
confidence each nation had of the other’s reliability in facing Japanese attempts to destabilize 
the boundaries set by the regional balance of power.98 British officials were equally 
impressed with the benefits of a collaborative approach to the specific question of the 
Philippines, as well as the more general move forward in creating closer and more 
synchronized strategic relations.99 
 In April, Anthony Eden circulated a FO memorandum on the future of the Islands to 
the CID.100 He informed them that President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and other senior 
members of the State Department had indeed held conversations with President Quezon in 
early March. Part of those conversations had been to warn the Philippine leader away from 
the idea of sounding out the British Government about possible entry into the Empire, while 
at the same time entertaining his concerns about future Island security.101 The FO reported 
that the Roosevelt Administration had agreed to better long-term economic and trade 
relations with the Philippines, allaying some of Quezon’s fears over the independent 
Philippines being economical vulnerable to both external exploitation as well as a decline in 
the domestic standard of living. As for British strategic interests in the matter, an unguarded 
Philippines would undoubtedly attract the interest of Japan. Seeking to spread its influence in 
the region, Japanese control of not only Philippine trade, but basing and forward deployment 
into the region adjacent to Singapore and Australia, would almost certainly mean the end of 
Great Britain’s control of those two imperial possessions.102 In light of the circumstances 
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confronting them, the FO asked the CID to consider the strengths and weakness, risks and 
advantages, of the four possible solutions recommended: 1.The incorporation of the 
Philippines into the British Empire or alternatively an alliance with the Empire. 2. The 
Philippines be granted membership to, and thereby obtain the international protection of,  the 
League of Nations. 3. The provision of a joint Anglo-American guarantee of the Philippines 
from foreign aggression. 4. The adoption of a multilateral treaty for the permanent 
neutralisation of the Philippine Islands.103 Although still somewhat reluctant to join with the 
United States, given certain reservations about that nation’s reliability in maintaining a 
cooperative relationship, the FO recommended that of the four options a joint Anglo-
American guarantee was the preferred way forward. From such a position of unity and 
strength, perhaps Japan could be coerced into joining the two Western powers in providing 
the multilateral treaty of neutralisation.104 However, the optimally desired outcome of any 
future British diplomatic efforts on the matter was for the United States to continue to 
provide security for the Islands and maintain the status quo in the region: `This, no doubt, is 
the best solution from the British point of view, and it is only in the event of the status quo 
being altered that alternative solutions arise at all.`105 Therefore, given that the State 
Department was thought to be about to approach the British Government for their position on 
the matter shortly; that President Quezon, while quiet for the moment, had not guaranteed he 
might not return to the question of Imperial protection at some point in the future through 
regular diplomatic lines of communication; and that New Zealand had raised the matter for 
discussion on the agenda of the Imperial Conference set to take place later that year, a sound 
strategic policy on the matter was required.106 
 In the spring of 1937, further conversations with the United States Government and 
work by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (COS) continued to clarify the British position. 
Utilizing Norman Davis’ presence in London to act as his emissary, President Roosevelt 
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informed  Anthony Eden and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain that 
neutralisation of the Pacific was a project he was keen to try and implement. The President 
informed the British that he was willing to join in a neutralisation treaty for the Philippines as 
part of a larger neutralisation programme for the Pacific which would include Great Britain, 
Holland, France and Japan.107 Work by the COS acknowledged the need to not disappoint the 
American President through a complete rejection of the idea, but also pointed out that, 
`Strategically it would be of the first importance that the United States of America should be 
associated in any such agreement.  In war we should primarily rely upon the exercise of 
economic pressure in order to defeat Japan, and the United States of America would almost 
certainly be prepared to assist in applying this form of pressure, even if they were unwilling 
to support their signature to the extent of providing effective military co-operation.’108 The 
COS also agreed that Japan would not sit quietly by and allow Great Britain to assume 
control over the Philippines.  
The inclusion of the Islands into the Empire would undoubtedly create not just a 
Japanese backlash against the British presence in the Islands, but also trigger a general China 
and Far Eastern-wide response. That response could take the form of not only more difficult 
trade and economic relations between the two nations, but more direct military action by 
Japan.109 It was unlikely, however, that Great Britain could afford to challenge Japan in this 
way alone: 
If the terms of the settlement allowed us to maintain forces in the Philippines in peace, 
we could, if we were prepared to accept the expenditure entailed, ensure that in war 
we should benefit …. The expenditure would, however, have to be very high, since 
we always regard Japan as a potential aggressor, and we could, therefore, only be 
certain of securing the integrity of the Philippines by taking adequate defensive 
measures in peace. Manila, in particular, would have to be protected on a scale 
comparable to that of Singapore. If, on the other hand, the terms of the settlement 
prevented us from maintaining forces in the Philippines in peace, we could not rely on 
having the benefit in war of the advantages of being able to operate from the 
Philippines, while we should at the same time have the added responsibility of co-
operating with the Philippines in the defence of their country if they were attacked.  
Any settlement which made us solely responsible for the defence of the Philippines 
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would, therefore, constitute a very heavy addition to our commitments; and it would 
also increase the risk of Japanese intervention against us when we were already 
involved in war in Europe... From our point of view, it is essential to prevent the 
control of the Philippines passing into Japanese hands, as such a development would 
seriously weaken our whole strategic position in the Far East.110  
 
The COS viewed the Philippines as occupying a central position in the `no man’s 
land` between the British and Japanese spheres of influence in the Far East. Whichever nation 
filled the strategic vacuum left by a disengaged United States would greatly improve its 
strategic position to the detriment of the other. To that end, the COS agreed that the best 
possible solution was to co-operate with the United States in both building a solid strategic 
relationship that could deter Japanese aggression, and, ensure that the Philippines remained 
firmly under the sole protection of the United States.111 The Japanese invasion of China in 
July 1937 consolidated this growing belief in the need for Anglo-American Far Eastern 
strategic cooperation by providing undeniable evidence of Japan’s desire to upset the existing 
regional balance of power and re-align the state of existing spheres of influence.112 
With the whole concept of peace in the region now in question, the strategic context for the 
interaction of British and American strategic relations changed completely. The Philippines 
question became a stepping stone on the road to parallel but not joint Anglo-American 
strategic relations as more vital strategic problems and challenges arose.113 
* * * * * 
By the spring of 1939, with the chance of a general European war becoming more 
likely, Anglo-American strategic relations in the Far East were strong and becoming more 
unified in their quest to thwart an agreed common threat: aggressive Japanese 
expansionism.114 Issues and interactions, such as the Philippine security question and 
resulting interrogation of future intentions by American and British strategic foreign policy 
makers had played a vital part in strengthening that relationship. The Philippine question was, 
however, only one of many instances where Anglo-American strategic collaboration was 
29 
 
required in order for that informal alliance to mature: Keelung, the Panay and Lady Bird 
incidents, Tientsin, the Burma Road, loans to China, economic sanctions, financial and naval 
planning for the blockade of Japan, were just some of the others. The result of this continued 
process of working through incident after incident, crisis after crisis, threat after threat, 
created by Japanese action, was for Anglo-American strategic understanding and trust to 
grow deeper and stronger through each experience.115  Both nations recognised the need to 
maintain the ability of their respective maritime power to play an irreplaceable role in the 
existing balance of power system, deterring, containing or coercing Japan. The potential loss 
of the Philippines into the Japanese sphere of influence represented a destabilization in that 
balance which consequently represented potentially devastating results. By March 1939, 
British fears of the Philippines becoming Japanified, or that the United States would abandon 
the Pacific and leave Great Britain to carry the burden of facing Japanese expansion alone, 
had been allayed. American fears of Great Britain striking a separate deal to appease Japan 
had also been addressed.116 The proof of the veracity of that informal strategic relationship 
was evident in the summer of 1939, when of the new British Ambassador to the United 
States, Philip Kerr, relayed to the FO and Whitehall his belief that President Roosevelt was 
willing to work with Great Britain in the Far East to continue forging a ring of iron around 
Japan, even in the face of a war in Europe.117 As such, the nature of the eventual Anglo-
American wartime alliance had already begun to take shape, with its roots not in Europe but 
in the Far East. The requirement to maintain boundaries and balances in the Far Eastern 
security environment had created new strategic bonds  between Great Britain and the United 
States.118 Those bonds, predicated upon personal relationships, shared values and 
experiences, and shared strategic appreciations being held within the foreign policy making 
machinery of each nation such as those demonstrated in the Philippine issue, would evolve 
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and grow ever closer under the realities of the European war and escalating tensions in the 
Far East from 1939-1942.119 
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